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“The threat of hostile takeover plays a vital role in keeping management on its
toes...All this Sturm and Drang seems a high price to pay for fending off a change
of corporate control that may, for all that appears, benefit the shareholders
greatly.”2
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I. Introduction
Anti-takeover strategies have long been in place to prevent hostile takeovers. One such
method, the poison pill, effectively makes shares unattractive to the potential buyer by raising the
cost of acquisitions. There are two types of poison pills: a flip-in plan and a flip-over poison pill.
The flip-in plan, when triggered, offers company shares at a discount to all shareholders except
for the potential acquirer. This dilutes the percentage ownership that the potential buyer has in
the company, and makes it more expensive for him to acquire. The other type of poison pill plan
is called a flip-over poison pill. This strategy, when triggered allows shareholders of the target
company to purchase shares of the acquiring company at a steep discount if the takeover is
successful. This will dissuade potential buyers if they believe that their own company value will
be affected post-takeover. Poison pills were at their heyday in the 1980s, but it is still used by
companies today to prevent hostile takeovers.
Though the first poison pill was invented in 1982, there remains discussion about its
effects on shareholders. Hitzelberger (2017) explains that poison pills in the U.S. can be passed
by the board of directors without consulting the shareholders in some states. In other countries,
however, such as Europe, poison pills cannot be passed unless the shareholders vote to ratify it.
This creates some curiosity, whether the board of directors is acting in the best interest of the
shareholders, or whether they are simply protecting their own positions on the board. This
question is the basis for two hypothesis that currently exist surrounding poison pills: the
Shareholder Maximization Theory and the Management Entrenchment Theory. Both are
explained in further detail in the literature review.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether more recent poison pill data supports
the Shareholder Maximization Theory or the Management Entrenchment Theory. In sum, this is
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an event study in which I will explore whether the stock price for a company goes abnormally up
or down immediately following a poison pill announcement. I examine the cumulative abnormal
returns of 28 companies within the following event windows: the event itself (0, 0), the
preceding day (-1, 0), the following day (0, +1), periods of three (-1, +1), five (-2, +2) and seven
(-3, +3) days, longer periods of pre-adoption (-15, -4) and post-adoption (+4, +15) which
represent “neutral” times, and periods (0, +10) and (0, +30). I then compare these returns to the
S&P 500 returns, the CRSP value-weighted returns, and the CRSP equal-weighted returns for the
same time period. My alternative hypothesis is that there will be abnormal cumulative returns,
and my null hypothesis is that there is no relation between poison pill announcements and
shareholder return. If there are positive abnormal returns I will attribute it to the Shareholder
Maximization Theory. If there are negative abnormal returns, I will attribute it to the
Management Entrenchment Theory. If there are no abnormal results, I will contribute this to
market efficiency and recognize that poison pills have no effect on shareholder returns.
This research is important due to a lack of recent literature on poison pills. Poison pills
were most popular in the 1980s, but there was also more negative sentiment surrounding them,
which could have affected market opinion, and thus shareholder return. This study aims to shed
further light on this hostile takeover strategy. The rest of the paper is presented as follows:
Section II reviews recent literature and prior results, Section III describes the sample
construction and data collection processes; Section IV discusses the event study approach,
Section V reviews the results; Section VI concludes the paper; and finally, Section VII explores
areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Multiple studies have been done on the topic of poison pills before. The most recent is
Simon Hitzelberger’s 2017 “What Effect do Poison Pills have on Shareholder Value?” which
uses data up until December 22, 2015. My study will be a compiled continuation of these prior
studies, testing an updated time period. In this way I will be able to compare my results with
prior results to determine if the conclusions hold true for more recent years. The first paper,
Hitzelberger (2017), outlines the two major existing stances on the subject. The first is the
Managerial Hypothesis, which states that hostile takeovers could be to the benefit of the
shareholder, but managers act in their own interests by enacting poison pills, and this causes the
stock price to decline. The other existing opinion about poison pills is the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Hypothesis, which states that managers know the value of the company better than
the shareholders, and managers are acting in shareholders’ best interests when they enact poison
pills. As a result, the stock price would go up if this hypothesis were supported.
Hitzelberger (2017) studied 4,479 recorded poison pills between 1997 and 2016 to
answer the question: “Does the effect of poison pills on stock price support the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis or the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis?” 854 events were
dropped due to not having adequate financial information available, giving him a total of 3,625
events included in the study. He compared these companies’ returns against three index
variations (the S&P 500, the CRSP database value-weighted, and the CRSP database equallyweighted). The three-day event window that Hitzelberger examined showed a 3.67% abnormal
return versus the S&P 500. He also benchmarked against the Carhart four-factor model and
found similar, but slightly lower results. These positive abnormal results following the
announcement of the poison pill support the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Hypothesis.
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Larcker, Reiss, and Xiao (2017) also studied the effects of corporate governance
provisions on shareholder return in their paper “Corporate Governance Data and Measures
Revisited.” Larcker et al. (2017) revised the data used in prior literature, to adjust for
discrepancies between two non-conforming data sources.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) used 28 IRRC corporate governance provisions and
compared them across 24 variables to create a “Governance” index. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009) used the same information but focused on six governance provisions to create an
“Entrenchment” index. These two studies found that holding a long (short) position in a firm
with few (many) shareholder takeover provisions provided monthly risk-adjusted excess returns
of 0.50% to 1.00% from 1990 to 1999, beating the market average and supporting the idea that
weak corporate governance is in the benefit of the shareholder, and strong corporate governance
is successful in entrenching the management, and maintaining low firm valuation.
When Larcker et al. (2017) reviewed the IRRC data compared with SharkRepellent data,
they found some discrepancies. The team compared the two data sources, focusing on six
Entrenchment provisions: the presence of a staggered board, limits to shareholder bylaw
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and
charter amendments. They were able to find and check 50-75% percent of market capitalization
covered in IRRC.
Their research revealed that IRRC data said 307 firms (19%) in 1998 did not have golden
parachute provision when they did, and 488 firms in 1998 (29%) did require a supermajority to
amend a charter that IRRC said did not. In addition, the definition of “supermajority
requirements” differed for IRRC (firms were only coded if they exceeded 50% and state law of
70%). Both IRRC and SharkRepellent ignored the supermajority requirement if there was a “fair
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price exception” mentioned—that is, the supermajority voting requirement is lessened to a
simple majority if the bidder agrees to pay at least fair market value for the stock. When Larcker
et al. (2017) adjusted the corporate governance “scores” for the various firms, many of them
moved towards the worst governance category and the returns dropped from 0.61% to 0.34% for
equal-weighted portfolios. When the team re-coded the E index, many firms moved towards
higher entrenchment scores. This also resulted in returns dropping, to around 0.24% for equalweighted portfolios. These results support the idea that the Governance (“G”) index, and the
Entrenchment (“E”) index are more fragile constructs and less conclusive than they were once
believed to be, suggesting that there is still room for additional research to be done on the effects
of corporate governance provisions like poison pills, on shareholder value.
Cain, McKeon, and Solomon’s (2016) study, “Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from
Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers” is another paper that contributes to poison pill research. It
fills in the gaps of prior research by studying 17 takeover laws and their long-term impact on
hostile takeovers between 1965 and 2014. They constructed a “Takeover Index” from three
sources: 1) legal determinants, 2) capital liquidity, and 3) a firm-specific factor that is not subject
to firm choice (firm age).
They then looked at firm-level economic outcome relative to this index and discovered
stronger takeover protection is positively correlated with lower firm value. They also found that
firm value is positively associated with susceptibility to hostile takeovers, and this finding is
significant across the entire sample. These findings support the management entrenchment
hypothesis, and signify that as hostile takeover rates decline, agency problems may be sustained.
Though these results signify that having weaker takeover protection means higher firm value, the
team also found a negative result. As firms became more susceptible to a takeover as measured
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by the takeover index, their takeover premiums decreased. This means that when a firm was
faced with a hostile takeover situation, they were less equipped to handle it and management
operates with less bargaining power in those instances.
Poison pills were coded (“S”) for strong if they showed that a board could incorporate
dead-hand or no-hand poison pills, which allow the pill to survive for a certain period of time,
regardless of whether or not the directors remain on the board. Overturned poison pills were
coded with an (“N”) for no, though these were often overruled by later courts. These Ns were
only coded after being reinstated by the courts. After 1990 and the Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. case the team assumed all states had normal strength poison pills
and coded accordingly, unless the state explicitly allowed strong-form (“S”) poison pills.
Cain et al. (2016) noted the significance of some takeover laws, yet they found that
poison pill laws had no real impact on hostile activity. They believe that acquirers often are able
to work around the poison pill anti-takeover barrier by running parallel proxy contests and this is
why it is often ineffective. This study mentions that though hostile activity was at its heyday in
1967 at 40% it still exists today at around 8.6%. Though lessened in popularity, its effects are
still pertinent and relevant to today’s times, making it an exciting area for research.
For this research paper I will be conducting an event study to test my hypothesis. S.P
Kothari and Jerold B. Warner (2016) discuss the value of event studies in their paper
“Econometrics of Event Studies” as, “In a corporate context, the usefulness of event studies
arises from the fact that the magnitude of abnormal performance at the time of an event provides
a measure of the (unanticipated) impact of this type of even on the wealth of the firms’
claimholders.” Therefore they are useful in the realm of corporate finance for understanding
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policy decisions, and what their effects will be on shareholder value. Event studies are discussed
further in this paper, in the Event Study Methodology portion.

III. Data and Summary Statistics
III.A. Sample Construction
To construct my sample, I utilized Bloomberg to identify companies from the S&P 500,
the NASDAQ, and the Russell 1000 that currently had a poison pill in place. This resulted in a
list of 25 companies. I then went through their 10K company filings to search for an explicit date
on which they announced the poison pill. From that list of 25, 14 companies were eliminated due
to vague information about poison pill announcement date. I then sought out prior research to
supplement my data. Hurt (2016) had over 150 companies dating back to 1998 that had enacted
poison pills. I selected 17 of those companies from that sample with the criteria that they had
passed a poison pill in 2011 or later, and were still publicly owned companies that had not been
acquired. All of the companies from Hurt (2016) had passed a specific type of poison pill called
an NOL pill. This type of poison pill is put in place to protect a company’s tax assets, namely
Net Operating Loss carryforwards. Companies are unable to hold on to their NOLs if a
significant ownership change occurs. Though they are NOL poison pills, the data supplied from
these companies however, should still support the overall effect of poison pills on shareholder
value. In total, my sample consists of 28 companies.
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III.B. Database Collection
EVENTUS
In order to analyze stock price reaction to poison pill announcements, I used Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS) Eventus software. The Eventus software uses historical stock
price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and is vital for conducting
event studies. For each company within my sample of 28 I found the corresponding PERMNO
identifying code using the company lookup tool in WRDS. I also used Eventus to translate the
dates of poison pill announcement from Excel into CRSP trading day numbers. I then used SAS
software to extract the Eventus corresponding shareholder returns for the event windows
specified: (-15, -4), (+4, +15), (-3, +3), (-2, +2), (-1, +1), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, +1), (0, +10), and (0,
+30). The event’s impact is then measured by the abnormal return (return relative to expected
return). Expected return can be modelled via the Market Model—which assumes a stable linear
relationship between market return and company return and uses each company’s individual
beta, or the Market Adjusted Model—which uses actual market return to “control” for potential
effects of the event on the general market and does not include company-specific beta. These
models are included in Section VIII Tables. Of the companies that were entered into Eventus, six
were dropped because of invalid PERMNO codes, leaving me with a total final sample of 22
companies. A portion of the SAS code entered into Eventus can be viewed in Appendix A.
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IV. Event Study Methodology
Studying stock price reaction to poison pill announcements will help further predict how
firm value will be affected by future shareholder rights plans. This could provide future
opportunities for investors.
An event study is performed by creating windows of time surrounding an announcement
date (termed date 0). For this study I have created 10 separate event windows surrounding the
announcement of a poison pill. I compare the results of these windows with the corresponding
S&P 500 returns, the CRSP value-weighted returns, and the CRSP equally-weighted returns to
see if there are any statistically significant abnormal returns. I used an estimation window that
starts 255 active trading days prior to the event and ends 46 days before the event window takes
place. I also have 10 short-term event windows. Both are listed as follows:
Event Window

Estimation Window

(-15, 14)

(-255, -46)

(+4, 15)

(-255, -46)

(-3, +3)

(-255, -46)

(-2, +2)

(-255, -46)

(-1, +1)

(-255, -46)

(-1, 0)

(-255, -46)

(0, 0)

(-255, -46)

(0,+1)

(-255, -46)

(0,+10)

(-255, -46)
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(0,+30)

(-255, -46)

This study employs both the Market Model and the Market Adjusted Model. The
equal-weighted index is included for both, but the value-weighted index was included only for
the Market Model, as the value-weighted Market Adjusted Model was not found to be
statistically significant.

Model

Index

Market Adjusted Model

Equally-Weighted

Market Model

Equally-Weighted

Market Adjusted Model

Value-Weighted

V. Results
Null Hypothesis: “The announcement of shareholder rights plans (poison pills) does not
have any effect on shareholder return. There are no abnormal cumulative returns.”
Alternative Hypothesis: “The announcement of shareholder rights plans (poison pills)
has an effect on shareholder return. There are either positive or negative abnormal cumulative
returns.”
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Table Results
Table 1 is a Market Adjusted model with an equally-weighted index. It displays the
results of all 22 companies: the number of companies with positive versus negative returns for
the event window, the mean cumulative abnormal return, as well as the various Z-tests for
statistical significance with the p-values in parentheses underneath. The event window (-2, +2) is
highly significant with a mean cumulative abnormal return of -1.95%. This runs counter to
Hitzelberger (2017), which found a positive mean cumulative abnormal return for the market
model of about 3.59%. It is also interesting to note that 30 days post-poison pill announcement
date (0, +30) according to the standard cross-section Z-test there is a statistically significant
return of 7.89%. We will see this trend continue in several of the other models.
Table 2 is a Market Model with an equally-weighted index. It is formatted in the same
way as Table 1. Similar to Table 1, the event window (-2, +2) tested highly significant. The
mean cumulative abnormal return was -1.82%, also running counter to the findings of
Hitzelberger (2017). All three Z-tests found the results of this event window to be significant.
The period (+4, +15) (post-poison pill) was also significant according to both the standard crosssection Z-test and the signed rank test. The mean cumulative abnormal return for this event
window was 4.85%.
Table 3 is a Market Model with a value-weighted index. It is formatted in the same
way as prior tables, with the number of companies of positive versus negative returns, the mean
cumulative abnormal return, and the three standard Z-tests for statistical significance with the
corresponding p-values. The window (+4, +15) has a statistically significant return by all three
Z-tests of 4.59%. This is in line with the findings of Table 2 as well as Hitzelberger (2017),
which found high positive abnormal return post poison pill announcement. Hitzelberger (2017)
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however, had higher mean cumulative abnormal return for the period (0, +1) versus my findings
of a high return for event window (+4, +15). The value-weighted Market Model also showed a
significant return for standard cross section Z-test of 6.32% for (0, +30). This high return postpoison pill announcement is similar to the findings in Table 1.

VI. Conclusion
Some of the results of this study are in line with prior research, notably Hitzelberger’s
(2017) “What Effect do Poison Pills have on Shareholder Value.” This study found positive
mean cumulative abnormal return for the periods (0, +30) and (+4, +15) of roughly 7.10% and
4.72%. Hitzelberger also found positive mean cumulative abnormal returns post-poison pill
announcement date.
My findings differ from Hitzelberger (2017) in some ways, particularly surrounding the
event window (-2, +2). He found highly significant positive abnormal returns, yet I found
significant negative returns of -1.95% and -1.82%. When I adjust the event window to see if
these negative returns are due simply to the aftermath of the announcement (period (0, +2)) I find
no significant results. Thus, the negative returns must be spread amongst the entirety of the event
window (-2, +2). This could be an area for future research.

VII. Areas for Future Research
As previously mentioned, delving deeper into the event window (-2, +2) could be an area
for future research, since the findings differed from some previous literature. Perhaps the
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findings were skewed due to the addition of the NOL poison pills from Hurt (2016). Dividing the
sample into subsets based on the type of shareholder rights plans might lead to some fascinating
results.
Additionally, two of the tables found significant returns (6.32% and 7.89%) for the period
(0, +30). These high returns imply significant shareholder wealth that could be obtained for the
investor who buys shares on the day of a poison pill announcement and holds for approximately
a month’s time. Many prior studies did not examine event windows this wide, yet they may
provide valuable information to the investor.
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VIII. Tables
Table 1: Market Adjusted Returns, Equally-Weighted Index
Market Adjusted Returns, Equally-Weighted Index
Mean Cumulative Std Csect
Days
N+:Generalized
Signed Rank
Abnormal Return Z
Sign Z
(-15, -4)
22
-1.75%
-0.663
-0.260
-23.500
10:12
(0.507)
(0.795)
(0.458)
(+4, +15)
22
4.77%
1.548
1.020
44.500
13:9
(0.122)
(0.308)
(0.153)
(-3, +3)
22
-1.69%
-1.700
-0.260
-31.500
10:12
(0.089)
(0.795)
(0.318)
(-2, +2)
22
-1.95%
-1.835
-2.393
-70.500
5:17<
(0.066)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(-1, +1)
22
-1.84%
-1.204
-0.687
-27.500
9:13
(0.228)
(0.492)
(0.384)
(-1, 0)
22
-0.78%
-0.295
1.020
8.500
13:9
(0.768)
(0.308)
(0.790)
(0, 0)
22
-0.49%
-0.183
-0.687
-10.500
9:13
(0.855)
(0.492)
(0.742)
(0, +1)
22
-1.54%
-1.252
-1.540
-41.500
7:15
(0.211)
(0.124)
(0.184)
(0, +10)
22
-0.21%
0.194
0.167
2.500
11:11
(0.846)
(0.868)
(0.938)
(0, +30)
22
7.89%
1.977
0.593
42.500
12:10
(0.048)
(0.553)
(0.173)
P-values are in parenthesis. The symbols (,<,<<,<<< or ),>,>>,>>> show the direction and
significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
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Table 2: Market Model Abnormal Returns, Equally-Weighted Index
Market Model Abnormal Returns, Equally-Weighted Index
Days
N+:Mean Cumulative
Std
Generalized
Signed Rank
Normal Return
Csect Z Sign Z
(-15, -4)
22
-2.51%
-0.806
0.200
-31.500
11:11
(0.420) (0.842)
(0.318)
(+4, +15)
22
4.85%
1.627
1.053
51.500
13:9
(0.104) (0.292)
(0.095)
(-3, +3)
22
-1.54%
-1.519
-1.081
-25.500
8:14
(0.129) (0.280)
(0.420)
(-2, +2)
22
-1.82%
-1.751
-1.934
-55.500
6:16(
(0.080) (0.053)
(0.070)
(-1, +1)
22
-1.75%
-1.178
0.200
-23.500
11:11
(0.239) (0.842)
(0.458)
(-1, 0)
22
-0.70%
-0.128
1.053
18.500
13:9
(0.898) (0.292)
(0.560)
(0, 0)
22
-0.48%
-0.163
-0.227
-0.500
10:12
(0.871) (0.820)
(0.988)
(0, +1)
22
-1.52%
-1.323
-1.508
-41.500
7:15
(0.186) (0.132)
(0.184)
(0, +10)
22
0.13%
0.279
1.053
14.500
13:9
(0.780) (0.292)
(0.649)
(0, +30)
22
6.83%
1.563
0.626
29.500
12:10
(0.118) (0.531)
(0.350)
P-values are in parenthesis. The symbols (,<,<<,<<< or ),>,>>,>>> show the direction and
significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
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Table 3: Market Model Abnormal Returns, Value-Weighted Index
Market Model Abnormal Returns, Value-Weighted Index
N+:Mean Cumulative Std
Generalized
Signed Rank
Abnormal Return Csect Z
Sign Z
(-15, -4)
22
-1.74%
-0.132
-0.210
-25.500
10:12
(0.895)
(0.833)
(0.420)
(+4, +15)
22
4.59%
2.113
1.924
51.500
15:7)
(0.035)
(0.054)
(0.095)
(-3, +3)
22
-1.21%
-1.144
0.216
-11.500
11:11
(0.253)
(0.829)
(0.718)
(-2, +2)
22
-1.45%
-1.279
-1.064
-34.500
8:14
(0.201)
(0.287)
(0.272)
(-1, +1)
22
-1.59%
-0.711
0.643
-14.500
12:10
(0.477)
(0.520)
(0.649)
(-1, 0)
22
-0.66%
0.065
1.070
15.500
13:9
(0.948)
(0.285)
(0.626)
(0, 0)
22
-0.45%
-0.054
0.216
5.500
11:11
(0.957)
(0.829)
(0.863)
(0, +1)
22
-1.38%
-0.913
-1.064
-34.500
8:14
(0.361)
(0.287)
(0.272)
(0, +10)
22
0.13%
0.574
0.643
18.500
12:10
(0.566)
(0.520)
(0.560)
(0, +30)
22
6.32%
1.671
0.216
22.500
11:11
(0.095)
(0.829)
(0.478)
P-values are in parenthesis. The symbols (,<,<<,<<< or ),>,>>,>>> show the direction and
significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
Days
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Appendix A
SAS Code for Eventus
/*********************************************************************************************************
EVENTUS 9.0
USING PC SAS CONNECT
ENVIRONMENTAL EVENT STUDY, DAILY RETURNS
**********************************************************************************************************
AUTHOR: Dr. Laura Cole, University of Tennessee
This information was compiled by the author and is provided as a public service. The author is not
responsible for any errors or omissions, or for any consequential problems that might result.
USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
**********************************************************************************************************
GLS THESIS FOR KATIE FOWLKES
*********************************************************************************************************/
/*********************************************************************************************************
STEP 1:
You will need to use PROC IMPORT to transfer your Excel spreadsheet into a SAS Dataset.
Set LIBNAME to your local windows directory.
If working from APPS@UT then you need to assign your H: drive to READ & WRITE, and then the libname is:
'\\Client\H$\Documents\ .... '
**********************************************************************************************************/
libname edata '\\Client\C$\Users\lscole\Dropbox\THESES\KATIE FOWLKES\Eventus';
proc import
datafile = '\\Client\C$\Users\lscole\Dropbox\THESES\KATIE FOWLKES\Eventus\Thesis Data'
dbms = xlsx
out = edata.eventus replace;
*The SAS dataset created is now in your temporary WORK directory.
*Also, issues with SAS 9.4 and Windows 64, need to use XLS filetype instead of XLSX.
You could change this to a local directory.;
run;
/*********************************************************************************************************
STEP 2:
You need to subset and "clean" your SAS dataset and format it for Eventus.
The general variable order should be:
PERMNO (or 8-digit CUSIP) EVENTDAT EVENTDAT2 ID GROUP GRPWEIGHT
In the following datastep, you need to complete the following:
(1) EVENTDAT & EVENTDAT2 will need to be in the format YYMMDD6.
(2) DELETE variables other than those above.
(3) Variables should be in the order above.
(4) If either PERMNO (or CUSIP) or EVENTDAT is missing, the observation needs to be DELETED.
However, when uploading a SAS dataset the variable names do matter, but the EVENTDAT format can be
relaxed. As of Eventus 9.0, we CAN upload a SAS dataset using PC SAS Connect.
/**********************************************************************************************************/
/* EVENTUS_ANNOUNCE: Base model includes all data for Announce Dates for Poison Pill Adoption*/
/* EVENTUS1: ALL DATA + ANNOUNCE_DATE */
**********************************************************************************************************/
* This will reorder the variables (not necessary, but makes it easier to analyze);
data edata.eventus_announce (RENAME= (announce_date=event));
retain permno announce_date;
set edata.eventus; *the SAS dataset of the original Excel spreadsheet;
run;
/**********************************************************************************************************/
/* EVENTUS1: ALL DATA + ANNOUNCE_DATE */
data edata.eventus1 (KEEP = newpermno event RENAME= (newpermno=permno event=eventdat));
set edata.eventus_announce;
format event YYMMDD6.;
if permno = . or event=. then delete;
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newpermno = permno*1;
run;

*Or you can add 0;

/*********************************************************************************************************
**********************************************************************************************************
STEP 3:
Run the EVENTUS program through PCSASConnect which allows us to avoid UNIX programming. You will be
prompted for your WRDS username and password.
**********************************************************************************************************
Please consult the EVENTUS manual for specific options.
REQUEST Statement:
AUTODATE Specifies that a calendar date in the request file that is not a trading day thus be converted
to the following trading day.
EST The absolute value of the argument of EST determines how many trading periods (days, months, etc.)
the estimation period is offset from the event date. The sign of the argument determines whether the
estimation period is pre-event or post-event.
EST=SPECIFIC selects an estimation period ending on the calendar or trading date specified
in the estimation date column of the request file (immediately after the event date in an ASCII
request file, e.g. EVENTDAT2), of length ESTLEN.
ESTLEN

Specifies the length of the estimation period in trading days, weeks, months, quarters, or years,
depending on the return interval being used for estimation in the current run. Default=255.

MINESTN

Specifies the minimum number of usable trading days in the estimation period (default=3).
Will remove firm if fewer than n days of return data.

WINDOWS Statement:
For a single event date event study, use WINDOWS to list up to 200 event windows for which cumulative/
compounded abnormal returns and test statistics are to be reported on the output. The earliest and
latest possible dates are determined by the value of the PRE and POST options respectively.
If WINDOWS statement is omitted, Eventus reports 3 windows: (-PRE, -2), (-1,0), (+1, +POST)
EVTSTUDY Statement:
PRE Specifies the number of trading days or months immediately preceding the event date for which to
compute abnormal returns.
POST

Specifies the number of trading days or months immediately following the event date for which
to compute abnormal returns.

MAR Market-adjusted returns benchmark method.
MM

Market-model benchmark method.
used in the literature).

The default is not to compute MAR.

This is the default (because it's the most popular method

STACK Selects an alternative event study report format in which medians are printed below means and
numeric p-values are printed below test statistics.
VALUE|BOTH By default, Eventus uses only equally weighted market index returns in MM and MAR.
Specify VALUE to change to value-weighted index or BOTH to produce separate event studies
using both indexes.
Statistical Tests (PATELL and GENSIGN are default):
PATELL

GENSIGN

STDCSECT
WSR

Specifies the Patell (1976) test. The Patell Z test is an example of a standardized abnormal
return approach, which estimates a separate standard error for each security-event and assumes
cross-sectional independence.
The generalized sign test is a nonparametric test that adjusts the fraction of positive
abnormal returns in the estimation period instead of assuming 0.5. The null hypothesis
for this test is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation
period.
Specifies the standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 1991).

The Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians.

TAIL=1|2

Specifies the significance levels of the reported test statistics is based on 1 or 2-tailed
tests. The default is TAIL=1.
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/**********************************************************************************************************/
/* EVENTUS1: ALL DATA + ANNOUNCE_DATE */
/**********************************************************************************************************/
%let wrds=wrds.wharton.upenn.edu 4016;
options comamid=TCP remote=WRDS;
signon username="lwallis" password="1f2fRfBf";
libname edata '\\Client\C$\Users\lscole\Dropbox\THESES\KATIE FOWLKES\Eventus';
rsubmit;
options fullstimer ps=60;
libname mywrds '/home/utk/lwallis';
proc upload data=edata.eventus1 out=mywrds.eventus1;
eventus;
title1 'EVENTUS1: ALL DATA + ANNOUNCE_DATE';
request insas=mywrds.eventus1 autodate est=46 estlen=255 minestn=3 ;
windows (-15,-4) (4,15) (-3,3) (-2,2) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,0) (0,1) (0,10) (0,30);
evtstudy noplist pre=15 post=30 mm mar both stack stdcsect patell wsr gensign tail=2;
run;
endrsubmit;
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